Alejandro Malaspina and the Perils of Projection

By Troy Karnes

On August 31, 1789, Alejandro Malaspina reflected on the deteriorating health of one of his marines. Ten days after his expedition left Cádiz the man became sick with venereal disease. This surprised Malaspina, who had described the man as “irreproachable.” Unwilling to besmirch his honor, the marine never disclosed his illness to the ship’s surgeon. In consequence, the disease progressed rapidly, and “after a month of unspeakable suffering, all his strength abandoned him, and left him unable to withstand the suppuration of the gangrene.”¹ The marine ultimately died of his illness, a common occurrence among eighteenth century seamen. In that respect, his story is unremarkable. But here it bears on my subject as a symbol of the difficulties that Spain faced in decline. Much like attending to the sick marine, curing Spanish decline, as Malaspina saw it, had three stages: history, diagnosis, and treatment.

Malaspina believed that a successful remedy depended on attaining an imperforated understanding of the colonies. Knowledge became an important tool that countries plied in the late eighteenth century in order to make claims about overseas territories.² Spain had become marginal in the eighteenth century, and it wanted to increase its power by accumulating information about its colonies. It believed that knowledge equaled power, though this is not the case, at least not with Malaspina, whose writings remained sealed by royal order for ninety-one years after he returned to Spain.³ Malaspina had a slightly more sophisticated, though still instrumental, view of knowledge. He did not see it as the ends, but rather the means to a solution. He recognized that knowledge is worthless on its own, but he thought that he could use it to
reverse Spanish decline. While his story challenges this belief, it was the premise of his departure.

Malaspina’s parents sent him to the Clementine College in Italy for his education, where he studied many enlightenment philosophers. He kept works by Jefferson, Hume, Filangieri, and Carli in his library. He particularly revered the philosopher and economist Adam Smith, whose influence pervades his political and economic ideals. After his education, he chose to pursue a career in the Spanish navy instead of following the religious path that his family wanted for him. His performance in the Spanish navy secured him the leadership of the 1789 expedition to the Spanish colonies in the Pacific.

Malaspina left port at Cádiz, on July 30, 1789. He focused on two subjects during his travels in the Pacific: science and politics. Scientifically, his most important task dealt with making detailed hydrographic geographic charts of Spanish American colonies. He also collected astronomical, botanical, biological, and gravitational data during the voyage. Politically, Malaspina wanted to present a report to the king describing the condition of the colonies, which meant examining the economics and bureaucracy of the Spanish colonial government in addition to gathering information of the competing British and Russian colonies in the Pacific.

Most comparisons of Malaspina link him with two other Enlightenment explorers in the eighteenth century: James Cook and Jean Galaup La Pérouse. These two explorers traveled in the Pacific earlier than Malaspina (Cook in 1768, 1772, 1776, and La Pérouse in 1785). Cook’s influence is apparent in the names of Malaspina’s two custom-made corvettes, the *Descubierta* (“Discovery”) and the *Atrevida* (“Daring”). When Malaspina revised the journal of his
expedition, however, he made sure to differentiate himself from his mentor. In his introduction, he explained that he went to the Pacific with a different attitude and aims than Cook. He did not voyage to discover; he voyaged to collect. He hoped that augmenting the crown’s knowledge of its possessions would lead to a curative for Spain’s degenerating empire.

Under the Hapsburgs Spain had become increasingly disorganized in its economy, its politics, and its military. As a strong Catholic power, the Spanish fought a number of religious wars during the seventeenth century against the Moors and Protestants that significantly depleted its treasury. Then, as Britain and France began to develop colonies in the New World, Spain realized that its colonies needed better defenses. The religious wars, in addition to the need for an increased colonial military presence, spread Spain’s responsibilities too thin. Consequently it suffered from a lack of men and money.

When King Charles II died without an heir in 1700, the Bourbons took power in Spain, bringing with them their experience of rational government. They simplified colonial administration by eliminating tax exemptions and the sale of political positions. They secured monopolies over tobacco and mercury and eased trade regulations. In order to further consolidate its power, it reduced the authority of the Church by reclaiming much of its land. Malaspina, however, doubted many of these reforms because he did not believe that the monarchy understood the colonies completely.

Spain began to develop its transatlantic empire about a century before Britain. The early Spanish colonies took advantage of lacking European competition in many ways. Anthony Pagden explains that the Spanish explorers who first wrote about the New World created a new genre because Europeans’ favored sources of knowledge—religious canon and classical texts—
did not explain the New World. The explorers claimed authority through their exclusivity of knowledge instead.13 As other European countries began to develop transoceanic empires, however, these Spanish claims depreciated.

Many eighteenth-century intellectuals mocked earlier Spanish explorers. De Pauw and Raynal provided the greatest criticism of the Spanish.14 They believed that the Spanish destroyed any opportunity to benefit intellectually from the New World for three reasons.15 First, many eighteenth-century thinkers accused the Spanish of putting too much emphasis on gains in wealth rather than knowledge. Second, European infiltration of the Pacific jeopardized Spanish security, so they limited foreign access to these territories.16 While Spain commanded respect through its monopolistic control on knowledge of the New World,17 eighteenth-century philosophers circumvented this problem by internally criticizing the Spanish texts.18 They argued that the descriptions provided by the early explorers did not make any sense, so they could not be true. Even Malaspina recognized the outlandishness of early descriptions of the Americas. He said, “In truth I can hardly recount the astonishment into which I have been plunged while considering to what extent Europe has until now believed an infinite number of absurdities, which one could not make true even if one expressly wanted to.”19

Finally, critics questioned the authors’ abilities to correctly perceive their surroundings.20 They fit most early colonizers into four categories: missionaries, traders, soldiers, and sailors. The intellectuals believed that the men who made up all four of these categories came from the lower classes and thus had suspect biases. In order to solve this problem, the intellectuals called for enlightened men to write accurate accounts of the New World.21 The Spanish took these
criticisms seriously and responded by funding a number of scientific explorations. They wanted the findings in order to regain their legitimacy.

On March 12, 1793, Malaspina arrived at the British colony of Port Jackson, New South Wales. The Spanish and British officers enjoyed an amicable relationship during Malaspina’s stay. The British treated the visitors very kindly, feeding the crew kangaroo at almost every meal, and the Spanish returned the hospitality by hosting a number of lunches onboard their ships for the officers and their wives. Malaspina’s crew stayed with the British for about a month. While he and his crew enjoyed the stay socially and performed scientific experiments, the political observations most interested Malaspina.

He did not believe that Britain had established the New South Wales settlement solely as a penal colony. His economic observations lead him to believe that the British established the colony to re-supply large fleets in the Pacific and provide luxuries to the motherland. He argued that the expensive subsistence associated a prison colony could not justify its establishment. The long voyage from Britain demanded substantial expense, as did the remunerations and accouters for the guards and civil servants. Many other writers of his time came to the same conclusion. In 1788, Francisco Muñoz wrote “A Political Discussion of the English settlements in New Holland.” In it he described the immediate and remote dangers of the British settlement. Immediately, Muñoz feared that the colony would have adverse economic effects for Spain by increasing competition on one hand and developing a black market in South America on the other. In time, he believed the threat would turn militaristic through piracy, direct invasion, or incitation of a potentially contagious revolution in the Spanish colonies. If these fears materialized, the Spanish would have had trouble holding onto their colonies along the
West coast of the Americas. In 1786 English historian John Stockdale added, “Should a war break out with the Court of Spain, cruisers from Botany Bay might much interrupt, if not destroy, their lucrative commerce from the Philippine islands to Acapulco, besides alarming and distressing their settlements on the west coast of South America.” The colony clearly had strategic value for the British navy.

In his “Axiomas Políticos,” Malaspina predicted that foreign nations would eventually invade the Spanish colonies, and he saw the British establishment of New Holland as a preliminary step in their preparation for war against Spain. Spanish leaders did not want to lose any overseas territories, especially to the British, and Britain’s spreading presence in the pacific disquieted Spain. In May and June of 1789, the Spanish arrested the crews of two British fur-trading ships near Nootka, off Vancouver Island, in an attempt to demonstrate its control over the area. While the situation did not erupt into a major conflict, Malaspina worried that more minor provocations like this could. He hoped to use knowledge gained during his stay to develop a strategy to stunt the British without fighting them. He devised a scheme inspired by Adam Smith in his “Political Examination.” The proposal relied heavily on the economic idea of comparative advantage. He knew that the British military could easily overpower the Spanish military, so he conceived a solution to attenuate their superiority. As an added benefit to avoiding war, he believed the plan would yield economic benefits.

Malaspina wanted Spain to sell livestock and foodstuffs to the colony of New Holland because the land around the settlement did not have many animals that the colonists could use to cultivate the land. During his visit, he learned that the colony imported its livestock from Bengal, but the journey usually killed 80% of the animals and shipping prices made the venture
expensive. Malaspina arrived just before a transport ship from Bengal that brought “one Bull, twenty-four cows, 220 sheep, 130 goats, five horses, and six asses” to the colony. During the trip all of the cattle, more than half of the sheep and asses, and one horse died. Given the colony’s difficulty obtaining livestock, Malaspina suggested that the Spanish take over as its main supplier. According to him, shipping to New Holland via Spanish ports in South America made the most sense because calm waters between the two locations gave the ships a safe voyage, and the climate made it possible to safely keep livestock on the deck. Keeping animals above deck increased the ship’s loading capacity. Furthermore, he recognized that the route provided many safe places to replenish food and water, and the best seasons to ship the livestock directly corresponded to the best months for the British colony to receive them. He concluded that these favorable conditions made Spain the best supplier for the colony at Botany Bay.

His desire to trade with the British appeared like a good way to make money, but it also seemed odd given the intense rivalry between the Spanish and British at the time. He ultimately wanted to make the colony more stable. He advocated this approach for two reasons. As mentioned above, he wanted to avoid military conflict with the British. He believed that Britain would be less likely to attack the nation that supplied its colony with essential goods. Second, he assumed that comfort would lead to indolence and greed. His argument followed that increased growth and security would force the colonists inland, where they would neglect their duties in favor of searching for precious metals. During Malaspina’s visit, British Surgeon General Dr. White told him that he suspected that a significant source of silver laid to the east of the city, in the Camarthen Hills. If the colonists found such a deposit, Malaspina thought their greed would lead to the colony’s collapse. He also predicted the British would have problems
with the natives in New Holland. He said that they killed any colonist who wandered too far inland without proper weapons for defense.44 The aboriginals had impressive weaponry, according to Malaspina, who described large, sling-thrown spears, accurate up to 300 feet away, darts made of fish bones for slightly closer targets, and clubs for close combat, the last studded with oyster shells to increase their violence.45

Malaspina’s plan to destroy the British colony seems to stem from a projection of Spain’s past rather than a logical solution to his present situation. He believed that the decline of the British Empire would follow the same patterns as the crisis-ridden Spanish empire. He equated the colonies in New Holland with Spanish colonies. The Spaniards’ desire to rule over the land and natives for personal gain led to many problems. Malaspina claimed that gold “is the cause, in short, of political mistakes which have kept us weak for three centuries and which have prevented us either from restraining the actions of our conquistadors or from exploiting them usefully.”46 As the number of conquistadores in the Americas grew, they began to fight each other for power and wealth. For example, Cortes’ rule was overthrown when he left Mexico City in search of the failed expedition of de Olid in 1524.47 The Spanish drive to extract wealth from the colonies created a volatile situation, and Malaspina believed the British would do the same. In addition to unsettled relations between Spaniards, indigenous rebellions disrupted colonial rule. In Peru, the Taki Onqoy movement represented the native attempt to regain power from the Spanish in 1560.48 Malaspina believed that the British colony had many of the same early signs of aboriginal unrest, so he assumed that they would face similar setbacks. He argued that “their steps are leading them however into the same pit into which have fallen all the other nations which have arrived at the highest degree of opulence and power.”49 He saw a simple role reversal
between Spain and Britain, but he did not recognize their essential differences, namely their discrepancy in political skills. It demonstrates how projection and bias can lead to faulty illations through historical analysis. Similar projections appeared in Malaspina’s opinions about Spain’s colonial policies.

On February 12, 1790, Malaspina recounted the desertion of a marine. He frequently dealt with desertions during his voyage, and he adopted strict punishments for sailors and marines who either attempted to abandon the expedition or acted inappropriately. This particular episode exhibits his martinetish style of leadership well. Malaspina assigned the marine to guard the blacksmith’s forge and cattle overnight. He absconded, stealing the blacksmith’s clothes and tools, with a local farmer. The farmer wanted the marine to help him with a project and also hoped the marine would marry his daughter. In the morning, when Malaspina learned of the desertion, he sent a group of soldiers to chase the insubordinate marine. They caught him and the farmer later that morning. Malaspina lined up his men and forced the marine to run the gauntlet three times. The farmer watched the beating, but Malaspina spared him of physical retribution because he had to support a large family. The harsh punishment did not deter other crewmen from fleeing, however. In fact, Malaspina’s crew diminished to about half of its original size within the first nine months. When he reached Lima, in the beginning of May 1790, he implemented a more progressive policy to encourage his men to stay with the expedition. He turned to economic persuasion to keep his crew onboard the ships. Instead of punishing soldiers who deserted, Malaspina began paying his men for attending the morning muster. He noticed a distinct improvement in his crew’s behavior as a result, but the reprieve in desertions did not last long after they left Lima. Malaspina’s continued inability to keep sailors on the ships almost
led to dissolution or reduction of the voyage on numerous occasions. Although he did not have much success effectuating successful economic policies with his crew, he continued to favor them over political solutions.

Recognizing that Spain had difficulties with its colonial politics, Malaspina wanted the Crown to take a different approach. Reflecting the strong influence of Adam Smith’s ideas, he suggested that Spain convert its political power over the colonies to economic power. He focused on increasing Spain’s economic efficiency. Scientifically, he concentrated on creating detailed maps of the geography and ocean currents of South America and the Pacific. Malaspina wanted to bring back more accurate maps of the Spanish empire because the maps that he carried did not always match his observations. On December 15, 1790, while off the southern coast of Panama, Malaspina noted that the Spanish national charts and “Jeffery’s British Chart” did not match his personal inspection of the area. Malaspina saw these discrepancies as frustrating and dangerous. With shallow shoals in the area, accurate maps helped captains ensure the safety of their crews and ships. Along with a desire for accurate geographical maps, he also believed in the importance of creating hydrographic charts in the Americas. Unknown ocean currents could force unskilled sailors off course, and Malaspina wanted to make sailing around the colonies safer and more efficient for inexperienced merchants to promote increased trade.

Malaspina did more than create better maps and charts to improve the economic stability of the empire. He also suggested bold political reforms. The Bourbons sought to centralize the colonial system in Spain in an attempt to strengthen the empire. Malaspina thought that centralizing the empire politically would not make it stronger. He proposed a plan for Spain to exert cultural influence over the colonies so it could benefit from them financially and reduce the
risk of costly revolutions. In his “Axiomas Políticos” he argued that the religious system could foster America’s prosperity better than politics and the military.54 His desire to focus on the church’s role in colonization directly conflicted with Bourbon ideology at the time.

The Bourbons wanted to decrease the power of the church and increase the power of the military.55 They strengthened the military by establishing a regular army for the creoles and by allowing them to join the militia.56 Spain did not employ colonists in the militia before the Bourbons for fear of revolution. When faced with severe shortages, however, they had to accept a lower quality of men into the service.57 The colonial religious institutions, on the other hand, were prospering. The church raised significant amounts of money from chantries, which allowed it to loan money, usually with 5 percent interest.58 In 1804, however, the state seized the capital from these chantries and all land owned by the church.59 Malaspina and the Crown agreed that continued imperialism in the Americas would lead to a stronger Spanish empire, but they disagreed on the methods needed to maximize the benefit. The crown wanted to continue the traditional form of political and militaristic control. Malaspina wanted to concentrate on culture and economics. He believed that reducing Spain’s political responsibilities over the colonies and promoting self-sufficiency had significant benefits. He argued that the colonies could only augment the Spanish treasury after they could sustain themselves.60 He wanted the colonies to supply their own ships, believing that the colonies had the resources for their construction.61 They would save money on the financial burdens of the administration of the colonies, too. Furthermore, he believed that colonists would work harder for their own livelihood—physical and political—than for a monarch.62
Malaspina also saw that abating conflicts between the colonies and Spain would temper tensions with the natives. To do this, he wanted to integrate them into the commercial system. He saw the natives as a source of inexpensive labor, and he also believed that commerce would pacify them.63 An eighteenth century Scottish model argued people evolved “through four evolutionary stages, hunting, herding, agriculture, and commerce.”64 These stages showed the gradual pacification of people, so commerce corresponded to the least violent stage. Malaspina’s argument directly follows this line of thinking, even though Scottish intellectuals could not make the model work in the Americas.65 With an acquiescent population of natives and autarkic colonies, Malaspina believed Spain could grow its wealth and avoid devastating revolution.

He reasoned that the strong-handed approach that the state pushed for would have a greater probability of leading to a colonial revolt. His opinions came at a time when a number of revolutions shook European powers. The Spanish knew how devastating a large colonial revolt could be. They had witnessed the American Revolution against the British eighteen years before Malaspina departed on his voyage, and many of the ideas he put forth in his “Axiomas Politicos” contain distinct correlations to the events on the east coast of America. The Haitian revolution perturbed the Spanish because it showed that a colony of slaves could lead a successful revolt.66 Finally, The French Revolution started just before he departed for the Pacific. The prevalence of revolution at the end of the eighteenth century did not go unnoticed by Malaspina.

Philosophically Malaspina did not like war, and he definitely did not like revolution. He viewed the French Revolution with disgust. In a letter dated August 23, 1790, to Paolo Greppi, Malaspina’s good friend, he asserted his belief that the French nobility showed too much patience with the lower classes. He believed that the success of the revolution would lead to a
more agricultural, free, opulent, and enfeebled nation—similar to Holland. Later, December 1791, in another letter to Greppi, he made another strong argument detesting the situation in France:

...[I] believe that France is currently living a valetudinarian dream, that she would have arranged her finances very well if she had not preferred to attempt to establish human rights such as one reads of in Rousseau; in short that while trying to diminish royal authority, through pitiless ridicule, she degrades man, be it in the people's hatred or in the King's apathy... let me believe that the legislators of France have only brought about her ruin, because they would like man to be as he is in books, without paying attention to what he has actually been and what he will always be... Cursed be he who would like to make of the populace so many philosophers; he will create nothing but fanatics, and philosophy will take the place, among men, of the religion of old, so that they will continue to slaughter one another until the end of time.

Malaspina acknowledged that his distance from the events may have led him to erroneous inferences, but his opinions give much insight on his views on revolution. He followed the conservative belief that the upper class should run the government. He, like many Enlightenment intellectuals, had classist biases. They believed that knowledge lead to truth, and since poor and uneducated did not have the proper training or experiences, they could not make rational decisions. Next, Malaspina abandoned the romantic idea that people are naturally good. He constantly discussed both points in his journal. He did not have a very high opinion of sailors. He said, “Men of this class, which Europeans consider valuable, were nonetheless more than any other given up to their passions and vices,” later saying that they had “erroneous notion(s) of happiness.” Finally, Malaspina had an equal uneasiness about intellectuals. He believed that their fanatic philosophies resulted in much of the world’s bloodshed. By denigrating the lower classes and the intellectuals, Malaspina showed that he thought monarchies provided the best government, as long as they did not overextend themselves. This governmental structure has
many similarities to the military, where Malaspina enjoyed a prominent position. The system
lessoned dependence on politics because status, not careful articulation and wide acceptance of
proposed policies, determined placement in the hierarchy.

The Spanish court feared revolt as much as Malaspina, but they saw a different potential
revolution. When he returned to Spain in 1794, he created uproar in the Spanish royal court that
eventually led to his imprisonment. They saw his ideas as inflammatory and dangerous. Manuel
Godoy, a powerful man in the royal court, believed that Malaspina’s political agenda would
result in a revolution in Spain similar to the one in France. This anxiety stemmed from his belief
that King Carlos IV should replace many members of the court, including Godoy. Malaspina
shared his opinion in letters to the king and queen. Unfortunately, he did not completely
understand the intricacies of the royal court, and Godoy intercepted them. He had Malaspina
arrested immediately and seized his work. The inseparable nature of Malaspina’s scientific and
political studies led Godoy to confiscate all of the writings from the expedition, leaving them
unpublished until 1885. The Council of State conducted a hearing to determine Malaspina’s
fate on November 22 and 27, 1795. They sentenced him to spend ten years and a day in the San
Antón prison in La Coruña, Spain.

Malaspina’s inability to effectively use politics does not denigrate his ideas. In many
ways Kendrick’s label of visionary is not too far off. He was able to collapse Spain’s colonial
chronology into the present. He saw Spain’s past in New Holland, its present in the colonies, and
its future in revolutionary France. Essentially he made a map of time. This gave him just
enough distance to see a broader picture of the situation. While the particulars may not have
unfolded exactly as he predicted, his general prognosis was very close. Eight years after
Malaspina’s return Napoleon shrewdly put his brother in charge of Spain. Then it lost most of its American colonies by 1825. While he could vaguely see this larger historical trend, he did not have the political skills necessary to do anything about it. Even if he could have garnered significant influence, it probably would not have made a difference. He could not reach a level of separation that would allow him to question the instrumentality of knowledge.

Many scholars describe Malaspina’s fall from grace with tragic romanticism. They see him as an enlightened man unjustifiably punished for his progressive beliefs. Carlos Novi, however, correctly identifies such romanticization as a “lingering cliché,” arguing that Malaspina may have let his personal ambitions get in the way of his national duties—a more plausible explanation. He never showed the political experience or skill necessary to present his ideas effectively during his voyage or in the royal court. On the expedition, he could not properly negotiate his power with the crew, so many abandoned him. When he returned to Spain, his clumsy politics led to his imprisonment.

Two interpretations explain the connection between Malaspina’s political failure and Spain’s decline. The first says that Malaspina projected his own personal inadequacies onto Spain. Unable to perform well in the world of politics personally, he looked for economic solutions and suggested that Spain should do the same. While this explanation seems logical, it falls short. Reducing national problems to the psychology of the actors ignores real societal forces. Attempting to divorce the person from society will never lead to a satisfactory explanation; they both play indispensable roles in the process. Furthermore, it reduces history to the vicissitudes of individual temperament, which trivializes the discipline altogether.
The better explanation draws the opposite arrow. Malaspina had difficulties with politics because Spain did. The powerful inertia of a long decline rendered political reforms impotent. Malaspina symbolized his time. As an enlightened intellectual, he tried to develop rational ways to improve Spanish society, but many problems simply do not have rational solutions. Additionally, he did not have the political experience necessary to make a potential difference in Spain’s future. Similarly, Spain did not have the political experiences necessary to deal with international competition. They held power over their overseas empire until other European nations caught up with them, but competition did not create Spain’s problems; it exposed the pre-existing inadequacies.

Both versions of this correlation demonstrate that Spain had serious problems that caused its irreversible decline. Much like the fatally ill marine that opened this examination, Spain had too much pride in its power to address its problems early. When those problems became acute, Malaspina and Spain both attended to them, but they failed because they only treated the symptoms. Inadequate politics, not a deficiency of information, produced the collapse of Malaspina and Spain. The colonial empire’s gangrene had pervaded too deeply for any treatment to remedy.

5 Kendrick, 41
6 Donald Cutter, Introduction to The Malaspina Expedition-1789-1794 Vol I: Cádiz to Panama, xxxii
8 Malaspina to Gherardo Rangoni, Cádiz, October 1788. APSF, 36-38.
9 Malaspina to Gherardo Rangoni, 36-38.
10 These reforms took place throughout the Bourbon Empire. In Apogee of Empire: Spain and New Spain in the Age of Charles III, 1759-1789, Stanley and Barbara Stein discuss Charles III’s reforms as the king of the Two Sicilies before he took over the Spanish crown in 1759.
11 Michael Ducey, lecture, 12/1/05
12 Ducey, lecture, 12/6/05
13 Anthony Pagden, European Encounter with the New World (New Haven: Yale University Press, 1993), 52-55.
14 Cañizares-Esguerra, 26
15 Cañizares-Esguerra, 12
17 Pagden, 52
18 Cañizares-Esguerra, 21
19 Malaspina to Paolo Greppi, August 23, 1790, Original in ASMi / Greppi (cart. 187, n. 61). <http://web.mala.bc.ca/black/amrc/index.htm>
20 Cañizares-Esguerra, 14-15
21 Cañizares-Esguerra, 15
22 Cañizares-Esguerra, 160
23 As the editors and translators of his journal mention, Malaspina’s calendar did not match the one at Port Jackson because he did not adjust it for the International Date Line.
25 Malaspina, Journal Vol. 3, 77
26 King, 99
28 King, 4
29 King, 4
30 King, 15
31 Malaspina, “Axiomas Políticos” 200
32 Malaspina, “Political Examination,” 119
33 King, 39
34 Malaspina, “Political Examination,” 114-115
35 Malaspina, “Notes Gathered at Port Jackson,” 128
36 Malaspina, “Notes Gathered at Port Jackson,” 129
37 David Collins, An account of the British colony in New South Wales [from its first settlement in January 1788, to August 1801]: with remarks on the dispositions, customs, manners, &c. of the native inhabitants of that country. To which are added, some particulars of New Zealand / compiled, by permission, from the Mss. of Lieutenant-Governor King; [and an account of a voyage performed by Captain Flinders and Mr. Bass ... abstracted from the journal of Mr. Bass] by David Collins, (Adelaide: Libraries Board of South New Holland, 1971), 270
38 Malaspina, “Political Examination,” 119
39 Malaspina, “Political Examination,” 114-115
40 Malaspina, “Political Examination,” 115
41 Malaspina, “Political Examination,” 118
42 Malaspina, “Political Examination,” 119
43 Fernando Quintano, “Notes Gathered at Port Jackson,” 128
44 Malaspina, “Political Examination,” 106
45 Malaspina, “Loose Notes on the British Colony of Port Jackson,” 162
40 Malaspina, Journal Vol. 1, lxxxvii
41 Ducey, lecture, 10/11/05
43 Malaspina, “Political Examination,” 119
44 Malaspina, Journal Vol. 1, 142-143.
45 Malaspina, Journal Vol. 1, 227
48 Malaspina, “*Axiomas Políticos*” my translation, 153
50 Kinsbruner, 13
52 Kinsbruner, 19
53 Kinsbruner, 19
54 Malaspina, Journal Vol 1, lxxxvii
55 Malaspina, Journal Vol 1, lxxxvii
56 Malaspina, “Political Examination,” 101
57 Cañizares-Esguerra, 262
58 Cañizares-Esguerra, 48
59 Cañizares-Esguerra, 48
60 Ducey, Lecture, 12/6/05
61 Malaspina to Paolo Greppi, August 23, 1790, Original in ASMi / Greppi (cart. 187, n. 61).
62 Malaspina to Greppi, December 20, 1791, Original in ASMi / Greppi (cart. 194, n. 80).
63 Cañizares-Esguerra, 262
64 Cañizares-Esguerra, 48
65 Cañizares-Esguerra, 48
66 Ducey, Lecture, 12/6/05
67 This is shown above in my discussion about the unreliability of missionaries, traders, sailors, and soldiers.
68 Malaspina, Journal, Vol 1, 8
69 Malaspina, Journal, Vol 1, 142
70 Novi, 315-316
71 Novi, 313
72 Gabriel Finkelstein, telephone conversation, 10/8/06.
73 Novi, 319
74 Novi, 319
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Paragraph 8.


---. to Antonio Valdes, , February 27, 1789 Copies in Archivo del Museo Naval de Madrid (Ms. 583, c. 34)
--- to Gherardo Rangoni, Cádiz, October 1788, copy in Archivio Provinciale dei PP: Scolopi di Firenze (APSF hereafter), pp. 36-38 http://web.mala.bc.ca/black/amrc/index.htm

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